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I
INTRODUCTION
The Summer 1982 issue of Law and Contemporary Problems, entitled Mental
Health, contained eight articles covering a broad range of mental health issues
facing the United States in the early 1980s.1 The 1960s and 1970s had
witnessed sweeping reforms in state management of the mentally ill, and the
symposium participants addressed, among other things, the new (narrower) civil
commitment criteria' and the problems associated with the resulting deinstitu-
tionalization of the mentally ill.3 While there were hints by 1982 that these
reforms were drawing to a close,4 the direction subsequently taken in several
states (including North Carolina, the publishing home of this journal) was not
predicted in our 1982 issue. This important development in the care of the
mentally ill has been the expansion of outpatient care.
Involuntary civil commitment of the mentally ill is typically thought of as an
inpatient arrangement: court-ordered 24-hour confinement at a facility that
provides a structured living environment and services that might include care,
treatment, habilitation, or rehabilitation. Another civil commitment option,
however, now available in most states, is "outpatient commitment." Outpatient
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1. See generally David L. Bazelon, Introduction, 45 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (Summer 1982).
See infra text accompanying notes 11-25 for a review of the civil commitment reforms spanning the last
three decades.
2. See, e.g., George E. Dix, Major Current Issues Concerning Civil Commitment Criteria, 45 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 137 (Summer 1982).
3. See, e.g., Bruce Ledewitz, Foreseeing is Believing: Community Imposition of Liability for the Acts
of "Dangerous" Former Mental Patients, 45 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 67 (Summer 1982).
4. See Alan Meisel, The Rights of the Mentally Ill Under State Constitutions, 45 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 7 (Summer 1982) (suggesting, accordingly, that advocates for the mentally ill turn to state
constitutional provisions for enforceable rights).
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commitment is court-ordered treatment in the community and is usually
characterized by short, recurring visits to a mental health clinic that provides
treatment such as medication, individual or group therapy, day or part-day
activities, or supervision of living arrangements.5
There are presently three types of outpatient civil commitment.6 The first
is traditional outpatient commitment, in which someone who would otherwise
be an inpatient is assigned to a community setting.7 The individual is adjudicat-
ed committable to an inpatient facility, but then is simply assigned to an
outpatient program. A familiar analogy would be probation, where, rather than
serving his or her prison sentence, a convicted criminal will live in the
community, subject to certain standards of conduct. The second type of
outpatient commitment is "conditional release" from an inpatient facility,8
which is analogous to parole, where a convicted criminal leaves prison early,
subject again to certain behavioral standards. The third type, which is known
as "preventive commitment," differs from the first two in that it targets those
not ill or dangerous enough to be committed to inpatient facilities under state
commitment laws.9
Preventive commitment, specifically the North Carolina scheme, is the focus
of this note. Part II describes the history and design of the North Carolina
preventive commitment scheme. Part III explores possible constitutional
difficulties with the implementing statute." Part IV identifies practical
5. Susan Stefan, Preventive Commitment: The Concept and Its Pitfalls, 11 MENTAL & PHYSICAL
DISABILITY L. REP. 288, 290 (1987).
6. Id. at 288. Nearly every state authorizes outpatient commitment, either explicitly or implicitly.
For recent surveys of state outpatient commitment statutes, see AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION
TASK FORCE ON INVOLUNTARY OUTPATIENT COMMITMENT, INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENT TO
OUTPATIENT TREATMENT 3-4 (1987) [hereinafter APA REPORT]; Geraldine A. McCafferty & Jeanne
Dooley, Involuntary Outpatient Commitment: An Update, 14 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP.
277 (1990). For a thorough overview of the primary two types of outpatient commitment, see Jillane
T. Hinds, Involuntary Outpatient Commitment for the Chronically Mentally Ill, 69 NEB. L. REV. 346
(1990).
7. Some states authorize or require placement in the least restrictive environment, thereby
implicitly authorizing outpatient placement; others explicitly refer to outpatient treatment. For
examples of statutes that authorize outpatient placement as a less restrictive alternative to involuntary
hospitalization, see ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-47-214(c) (Michie 1991) (implicit); IDAHO CODE § 66-329(k)
(1989) (implicit); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.09 (West 1990) (implicit); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 7304(f)
(Supp. 1994) (explicit).
8. For examples of inpatient civil commitment schemes authorizing conditional release to
outpatient status, see ALA. CODE § 22-52-57 (1990); KY. REV. STAT. § 202A.181 (1992); OR. REV.
STAT. § 426.130 (1987).
9. For examples of outpatient commitment using broadened substantive criteria, see GA. CODE
ANN. § 37-3-81 (1982); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 334-121 to -134 (1991 & Supp. 1994); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 122C-271 (1994). See also APA REPORT, supra note 6, at 19-20 (proposed guidelines for outpatient
commitment).
10. While the U.S. Supreme Court has not ruled on outpatient commitment of any sort, this note
analyzes other cases, including a variety of inpatient civil commitment cases, and concludes that
preventive commitment probably satisfies substantive due process. Although the outpatient statutes
differ procedurally from the inpatient commitment statutes, a procedural due process analysis of
outpatient civil commitment in North Carolina would be well beyond the scope of this note. Moreover,
while the outpatient statutes differ in significant ways (for example, they provide no right to counsel
and no explicit right to confront or cross-examine witnesses, see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-267 (1994)),
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problems with the current administration of the scheme, reviewing, for example,
problems with noncompliance and enforcement. Part V, the conclusion, briefly
addresses the prospect of forcible medication, and argues that individualized
case management through local mental health clinics is the more effective and
humane way of serving the interests of both the individual and the state.
II
BACKGROUND
A. History of the 1983 Statute
In the 1960s and early 1970s, as the civil rights movement spread to the
treatment of mental patients, public support of expansive civil commitment
schemes was replaced by a desire to restrain the state's commitment authori-
ty.11 Commentators have linked this shift in public opinion to such factors as
a growing recognition that involuntary hospitalization involves a serious loss of
liberty, increasing awareness of the stark conditions in mental hospitals, and the
U.S. Supreme Court's rulings on privacy. 2 The change in public attitude
manifested itself in, among other things, community mental health workers and
civil rights groups working for deinstitutionalization of inpatients.
13
It was against this background, in 1973, that the North Carolina General
Assembly enacted its first outpatient civil commitment law, using the same
substantive criteria for outpatient commitment as were then in place for
inpatient commitment (specifically, that the patient be "mentally ill" and
"imminently dangerous to others"). 4 Almost immediately after this legislative
from a practical perspective, this distinction may matter little. Outpatient and inpatient hearings are
effectively the same in North Carolina courts; judges tend to provide the inpatient procedures in both
instances. Interview with Marvin Swartz, M.D., Duke Hospital, in Durham, N.C. (Jan. 12, 1995)
[hereinafter Swartz Interview]. The inpatient statutes also have been found to satisfy procedural due
process. See French v. Blackburn, 428 F. Supp. 1351 (M.D.N.C. 1977).
11. Mary L. Durham & John Q. LaFond, The Empirical Consequences and Policy Implications of
Broadening the Statutory Criteria for Civil Commitment, 3 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 395, 397 (1985);
Virginia Aldig6 Hiday & Teresa L. Scheid-Cook, The North Carolina Experience with Outpatient
Commitment: A Critical Appraisal, 10 INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 215, 215 (1987) [hereinafter Hiday &
Scheid-Cook, Critical Appraisal].
12. Durham & LaFond, supra note 11, at 397; see also Hinds, supra note 6, at 346-47 ("Public
awareness of abuse and neglect of the mentally ill in large, isolated state and county institutions, new
antipsychotic medications, and increasing involvement of the legal system in the care of the mentally
disabled provided the impetus for the policies of deinstitutionalization and community care .... "
(citations omitted)); Stacy E. Seicshnaydre, Comment, Community Mental Health Treatment for the
Mentally Ill-When Does Less Restrictive Treatment Become a Right?, 66 TuL. L. REV. 1971, 1971-72
(1992) (linking deinstitutionalization to the discovery of large, overcrowded hospitals plagued with
neglect and brutality and to the influence of writings by Thomas Szasz (citing THOMAS SZASZ,
MANUFACTURE OF MADNESS (1970); THOMAS SZASZ, MYTH OF MENTAL ILLNESS: FOUNDATIONS OF
A THEORY OF PERSONAL CONDUCT (1961))).
13. APA REPORT, supra note 6, at 1.
14. 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws, ch. 726, § 1; 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws, ch. 1408, § 1. In 1979 the North
Carolina General Assembly rewrote the second substantive criterion, deleting the word "imminently."
1979 N.C. Sess. Laws, ch. 915, §§ 8, 15, 16.
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initiative in North Carolina, the U.S. Supreme Court decided O'Connor v.
Donaldson,15 which is usually cited for the proposition that inpatient civil
commitment of an adult requires a showing of mental illness and dangerous-
ness.16 In response to this ruling, or simply to explore less restrictive alterna-
tives, many states tightened their substantive criteria for inpatient commit-
ment. 7 In the wake of the resulting flood of released inpatients,"8 a large
portion of the chronically mentally ill population became known as "revolving
door patients."' 9
Revolving door patients are those chronically mentally ill who will not seek
treatment on their own and who have a pattern of regularly relapsing and
becoming dangerous. 2 As the O'Connor decision has been interpreted, the
state may not commit such individuals until they become dangerous. Once they
do, the state hospitalizes and medicates them, at which point they cease to be
dangerous and must be released. Once released, they stop taking their
medication and the cycle resumes. 21 The revolving door syndrome inheres in
state management of the mentally ill; it is a byproduct of combining a
substantive threshold for triggering state intervention with chronic mental illness
that responds to medication.
With the 1980s, however, came a newly expanded view of the state's role in
management of the mentally ill22 and advocacy by mental health patients for
lower standards of commitment.' In 1983, the North Carolina legislature
passed new outpatient commitment statutes,24 expanding the criteria so as to
embrace patients not yet committable to an inpatient facility under either North
15. 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
16. The Court's holding is actually considerably narrower than this. See infra text accompanying
notes 81-96.
17. APA REPORT, supra note 6, at 1. This transition has been described as a shift from a "medical"
model to a "legal" model of civil commitment. See Virginia Aldigd Hiday, Civil Commitment A Review
of Empirical Research, 6 BEHAVIORAL SCi. & L. 15, 16 (1988) ("A basic assumption in these reforms
was that a legal standard, 'dangerousness,' as opposed to a medical standard, 'need for treatment,'
coupled with formal legal procedures as opposed to informal medical practices, would provide necessary
scrutiny of the mental health establishment and would, thus, remove the cloak of paternalism
responsible for past abuses."); Virginia A. Hiday & Teresa L. Scheid-Cook, A Follow-up of Chronic
Patients Committed to Outpatient Treatment, 40 Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 52, 52 (1989)
[hereinafter Hiday & Scheid-Cook, Follow-up] ("In most jurisdictions the law has rejected the medical
model of commitment, which allowed involuntary hospitalization of the mentally ill when they needed
treatment, and has substituted a legal model that emphasizes due process and permits involuntary
hospitalization only of the mentally ill who are judged to be dangerous.").
18. See APA REPORT, supra note 6, at 1 (noting "massive depopulation of the public mental
hospital system"); id. ("75% reduction in inpatient censuses in public mental hospitals" over the 30-year
period between 1957 and 1987); see also Hinds, supra note 6, at 348 n.9.
19. See generally Hiday & Scheid-Cook, Critical Appraisal, supra note 11; Stefan, supra note 5.
20. See APA REPORT, supra note 6, at I (defining revolving door as "repeated brief hospitalizations
followed by relapse after discharge").
21. Hiday & Scheid-Cook, Critical Appraisal, supra note 11, at 215.
22. Durham & LaFond, supra note 11, at 398 (noting return to expanded role for the state in the
mid-1980s).
23. See id. at 396-99; Hiday & Scheid-Cook, Critical Appraisal, supra note 11, at 216.
24. 1983 N.C. Sess. Laws, ch. 638, § 14; see N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 122C-263(d)(1), -267(h) (1994).
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Carolina law or O'Connor, as interpreted.' The new outpatient commitment
scheme was designed to prevent the otherwise inevitable periodic inpatient
commitment of revolving door patients. Accordingly, it is called "preventive
commitment."
B. Description of the Statute
In the first step of preventive commitment in North Carolina, anyone may
petition a magistrate or clerk of a superior court for issuance of an order to take
the respondent (the individual named in the petition) into custody.26 The
magistrate or clerk may then issue a "custody order."27 To issue a custody
order for outpatient commitment, the magistrate must have reasonable grounds
to believe that the person is mentally ill' and, based on his psychiatric history,
in need of treatment to prevent further disability or deterioration that would
predictably result in future dangerousness.2 If the petition is filed by a
nonphysician, the respondent is taken into custody for examination by a
physician or eligible psychologist.3" The respondent is then given a date and
a time at which to appear for treatment, and is transported home and
released" pending a commitment hearing.32 If the petition is instead filed by
a physician who recommends outpatient commitment, and if the magistrate finds
probable cause to believe that the respondent meets the criteria for outpatient
commitment, then the magistrate simply issues an order for the hearing.33
Most persons placed on outpatient status in North Carolina, however, are
not initially considered to be candidates for preventive commitment; instead
25. See Hiday & Scheid-Cook, Follow-up, supra note 17, at 53 ("[T]he North Carolina state
legislature, after a decade under reformed civil commitment laws, made outpatient commitment criteria
less restrictive than involuntary hospitalization criteria, provided a mechanism for enforcing outpatient
commitment, gave facilities and staff immunity from liability, and allocated funds to community mental
health centers for each patient they treated on outpatient commitment.").
26. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-261 (1994).
27. Id. § 122C-261(b).
28. When applied to an adult, "mental illness" means an illness that lessens an adult's ability to use
self-control, judgment, and discretion, such that it is necessary or advisable that he be under treatment,
care, supervision, guidance, or control. Id. § 122C-3(21).
29. Id. § 122C-261(b). A person is "dangerous" if he is dangerous to himself or to others. A
person is dangerous to himself if, absent treatment, (1) he is unable to care for himself and likely to
suffer serious physical debilitation in the near future, (2) he has attempted suicide or threatened suicide
and is likely to commit it, or (3) he has mutilated himself or threatened to mutilate himself, and is likely
to do so. A person is dangerous to others if (1) he has engaged in the extreme destruction of property
and there is a reasonable probability he will do so again, or (2) he has threatened to inflict, attempted
to inflict, inflicted, or created a substantial risk of serious bodily harm to another, and there is a
reasonable probability he will do so again. Id § 122C-3(11); see APA REPORT, supra note 6, at 20
("North Carolina [has] operationalized [its] definition of deterioration to the point of dangerousness
by requiring that determinations be based on past treatment records. This approach has the virtue of
providing specific evidence of past behavior, the best basis for prediction of human behavior.").
30. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-261(b) (1994) (setting forth the criteria pursuant to which the physician
may recommend outpatient commitment); id. § 122C-263(c).
31. Id § 122C-263(f).
32. Id § 122C-264(a).
33. Id. § 122C-261(d).
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outpatients tend to have been inpatients "stepped down" to outpatient status at
some point during the inpatient commitment process.34 An inpatient might be
stepped down to outpatient status either at the hospital or at the district court
hearing.
By and large, most patients are stepped down at the hospital.35 If a
petition for inpatient commitment is filed by a nonphysician (for example, by
a family member), the respondent is taken into custody for a first examination.
If the examining physician instead recommends outpatient commitment, she
identifies the proposed treatment physician or center, and the respondent is
released pending a district court hearing.36 The respondent is also directed to
appear at the treatment center at a specified date and time.37 A second
examination of candidates for inpatient commitment takes place within twenty-
four hours of arrival at a facility;38 if this physician finds only the criteria for
outpatient commitment satisfied, then she sets an appointment for the
respondent with an outpatient physician and releases him pending a district
court hearing.39
A respondent recommended for outpatient commitment (either at a
magistrate's behest based on a petitioning physician or as a "step-down") is
ordered to appear for examination by the proposed treatment provider at a
particular date and time, and slated for a civil commitment hearing. In the
meantime, the proposed physician or treatment center may prescribe reasonable
and appropriate medication and treatment.' However, the respondent can be
neither physically forced to take the medication nor forcibly detained.4'
In such a situation, a civil commitment hearing must be held within ten days
of the beginning of custody.42 The order for outpatient commitment must be
supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that the person is mentally
ill, capable of surviving safely in the community with available supervision, in
need of treatment in order to prevent further disability or deterioration that
would predictably result in dangerousness, and limited in his ability to make or
simply unable to make an informed decision to seek voluntary treatment or to
comply with recommended treatment.43 At this stage, of course, a candidate
for inpatient commitment could be rerouted to outpatient status.
34. Swartz Interview, supra note 10.
35. Id.
36. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-263(d)(1) (1994).
37. Id. § 122C-263(f).
38. Id. §§ 122C-266, -285.
39. Id. § 122C-266(a)(2).
40. Id. § 122C-265(b).
41. Id. § 122C-265(c).
42. Id. §§ 122C-267(a) (outpatient), -268(a) (inpatient).
43. Id. §§ 122C-267(h), -263(d)(1). There must also be a finding of fact as to the actual availability
of outpatient treatment. Id. § 122C-271(b)(4). By way of contrast, an inpatient commitment order must
be supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that the person is mentally ill and dangerous.
Id. §122C-268(j).
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DUE PROCESS ANALYSIS OF THE STATUTES
A. Due Process
The notion underlying the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment is that certain interests of the individual (life, liberty, and property) are so
fundamental that they cannot be taken away by the state without "due
process."'  Identifying a constitutionally protected interest is, thus, the first
step of due process analysis. The guarantee of substantive due process is that
only sufficiently weighty interests justify any encroachment on a liberty
interest.45 The procedural component of the Due Process Clause is the
guarantee of certain procedures to accompany such an intrusion. Thus, due
process analysis includes both a substantive question (under what circumstances,
if any, infringement of this interest would be permissible) and a procedural
question (how the state is to determine if the infringement is justifiable in the
particular situation).'
The outpatient commitment statutes of North Carolina give the state a new
role in management of the mentally ill. While they may be susceptible to a due
process challenge, none has yet been brought.
B. Preventive Commitment and Substantive Due Process
1. The Reasonable Relation Rule. A threshhold question for substantive
due process analysis is the level of scrutiny to which the state's preventive
commitment scheme will be subjected by a reviewing court. In general, the U.S.
Supreme Court has afforded substantial latitude to the states in the area of civil
commitment.47 While the Due Process Clause places some procedural and
substantive constraints on state regulation in matters of health and general
44. The Fourteenth Amendment provides that "[no] State [shall] deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
45. Some interests (for example, freedom of contract) have low weight and can be regulated on the
basis of a minimum rationality justification. Regulation of other liberty interests requires a compelling
state interest.
46. See Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 299 (1982) ("[T]he substantive issue involves a definition of
th[e] protected constitutional interest, as well as identification of the conditions under which competing
state interests might outweigh it. The procedural issue concerns the minimum procedures required by
the Constitution for determining that the individual's liberty interest is actually outweighed in a
particular instance.").
47. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 322 (1982) ("[W]e emphasize that courts must show
deference to the judgment exercised by a qualified professional. By so limiting judicial review of
challenges to conditions in state institutions, interference by the federal judiciary with the internal
operations of these institutions should be minimized."); id. at 317 ("[A] State necessarily has
considerable discretion in determining the nature and scope of its responsibilities."); Addington v.
Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 431 (1978) ("The essence of federalism is that states must be free to develop a
variety of solutions to problems and not be forced into a common, uniform mold. As the substantive
standards for civil commitment may vary from state to state, procedures must be allowed to vary so
long as they meet the constitutional minimum.").
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welfare, the Court's tendency has been to articulate a constitutional minimum
and then leave substantial room for state-by-state experimentation."
Substantive due process requires a reasonable relationship between the
nature and duration of commitment, and its purpose and basis. The Court
articulated this "reasonable relation" rule in Jackson v. Indiana,49 when it held
unconstitutional the involuntary commitment of a criminal defendant who had
been found incompetent to stand trial. Although Jackson's recovery was
unlikely, the trial court had committed him until the hospital could certify his
sanity.5" This confinement was tantamount to permanent institutionalization
on a mere showing that Jackson was incompetent to stand trial ("mere" because
the state had a lesser burden than it would have had for civil commitment51).
In finding a due process violation, the Court explained that no reasonable
relationship existed between the permanent duration of commitment and its
stated purpose of helping Jackson regain competence for trial.52 Instead, such
a defendant could be held only for a reasonable time, meaning the time
necessary to determine his chances of regaining the capacity to stand trial. If
the chances were slim, the state would have to initiate civil commitment
proceedings or release him.53
2. Liberty Interests. Identifying a constitutionally protected interest is the
first step of due process analysis.
a. Physical freedom. North Carolina's preventive commitment scheme
implicates a liberty interest in freedom, though to a considerably lesser extent
than any inpatient civil commitment scheme. In writing that "civil commitment
for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty,"54 the U.S.
Supreme Court was addressing the strength of this liberty interest in physical
48. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 608 n.16 (1979) ("As the scope of governmental action
expands into new areas creating new controversies for judicial review, it is incumbent on courts to
design procedures that protect the rights of the individual without unduly burdening the legitimate
efforts of the states to deal with difficult social problems.").
49. 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
50. Id. at 719.
51. Specifically, the state showed only that Jackson "lack[ed] comprehension sufficient to make his
defense." I& The state's burden to commit him civilly as mentally ill would have been a showing of
(1) mental illness, (2) need for care, and (3) dangerousness. Id. at 727-29. The Court also found an
equal protection violation: Insofar as the state subjected Jackson to "a more lenient commitment
standard and to a more stringent standard of release than those ... others not charged with offenses,"
Indiana condemned him "to permanent institutionalization without the showing required for
commitment or the opportunity for release afforded by [the statutes for commitment of the mentally
ill and the feeble minded]." Id. at 730.
52. Id. at 738.
53. In dicta, the Court approved the federal provisions for commitment of incompetent criminal
defendants, which the federal courts have construed to require precisely this. Id. at 731-33 (discussing
28 U.S.C. §§ 4244-4246).
54. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979); see also O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563,
580 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring) ("There can be no doubt that involuntary commitment to a mental
hospital, like involuntary confinement of an individual for any reason, is a deprivation of liberty which
the state cannot accomplish without due process of law.").
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freedom in the context of inpatient commitment; the Court has not yet
identified the extent to which outpatient commitment (of any sort) similarly
entrenches on it. By and large, commentators assume that outpatient
commitment intrudes less on this liberty interest than does inpatient place-
ment, 5 an assumption that finds support in the Court's treatment of parole and
probation vis-A-vis incarceration, 56 at least with respect to nonpreventive
schemes. That is, reconfinement of convicted criminals released on parole or
probation requires due process, because release (re)created a protected liberty
interest. So outpatient commitment schemes analogous to parole (that is,
conditional release schemes) and probation (that is, community placement
schemes) return to those patients some of the "liberty" interest in physical
freedom deprived at the original inpatient civil commitment hearing. 7
Preventive commitment, by way of contrast, is more akin to placing someone
on probation without a criminal conviction. Rather than depriving a person of
his liberty and then returning some (a lesser portion), it deprives him of less to
begin with. The net result is not the same, given the conspicuous absence of a
threat of comparatively swift reincarceration and rehospitalization. 8 Thus,
preventive commitment results in at most the same net deprivation of liberty as
do other outpatient commitment schemes, and arguably it effects a lesser
deprivation.
b. Reputation. Although the Court has not been receptive to viewing
damage to reputation alone as a deprivation of either liberty or property, 9
there is some basis for inferring that a deprivation of liberty that also affects
reputation might be treated as more invasive than a deprivation of liberty alone.
In 1970, the Court found that due process requires notice and a hearing before
the state may post a notice in retail liquor outlets forbidding sale of alcohol to
55. See, e.g., Lynn E. Gunn, Outpatient Commitment for the Mentally Ill, POPULAR GOV'T., Spring
1987, at 18.
56. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973) ("Petitioner does not contend that there is
any difference relevant to the guarantee of due process between the revocation of parole and the
revocation of probation, nor do we perceive one."); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 483 (1972)
(Revocation of parole does not require the procedural safeguards of a criminal trial, "given the previous
conviction and the proper imposition of conditions.").
57. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (requiring procedural safeguards for
reconfinement of parolees); C.R. v. Adams, 649 F.2d 625,628 (8th Cir. 1981) (noting that "lower federal
courts ... have uniformly found that the conditional liberty interest of a mental patient ... on
outpatient status cannot be summarily terminated without notice and the opportunity for a hearing");
Birl v. Wallis, 619 F. Supp. 481, 490 (M.D. Ala. 1985) (extending rule from parole revocation cases to
reconfinement of conditionally released mental health patients); Meisel v. Kremens, 405 F. Supp. 1253
(E.D. Pa. 1975) (equating the liberty interest created by conditional release to the liberty interest
created by parole).
58. While reincarceration of parolees requires due process of law, it does not require a full-fledged
criminal trial. Similarly, the state need not repeat the full civil commitment hearing in order to
rehospitalize conditionally released inpatients.
59. See, e.g., Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976) (holding mere injury to reputation alone not a
deprivation of "liberty").
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an individual on account of her excessive drinking.' While the Court held six
years later that injury to reputation alone is not of its own accord a deprivation
of liberty, the Court distinguished its earlier ruling by noting that posting had
"significantly altered [the person's] status as a matter of state law" and
concluded that the "alteration of legal status, . . . combined with the injury
resulting from the defamation, justified the invocation of procedural safe-
guards., 61  So, while the imposition of stigma by the state may not in itself
trigger the Due Process Clause, a state action that deprives the individual of
liberty and imposes a stigma may thereby be a greater deprivation of constitu-
tionally protected liberty. In other words, stigma imposed is a factor in due
process analysis.
Preventive commitment unquestionably implicates an interest in "reputa-
tion." First, some stigma arises when one is not treated, despite serious mental
illness. 62 Although being "free" of stigma is arguably a sort of "liberty," it is
very different from the liberty interest in being free of physical restraint. The
state does not impose the stigma as it might the restraint, and the state action
constituting deprivation could only be its failure to remove the stigma through
medical treatment. A mentally ill person would have to allege that the state's
failure to commit him constituted a deprivation of a protected liberty interest
in a stigma-free reputation. Ordinarily, however, the government has no duty
to prevent others from working a deprivation of liberty or property.63 It is
thus unlikely that the individual has a constitutionally protected liberty interest
in being stigma-free that can, of its own impetus, give rise to a state duty to
prevent or remove the stigma.' 4 Second, the state may impose a stigma when
it erroneously commits a person who is not mentally ill.65  One so confined
would likely bring a suit for the erroneous deprivation of liberty, that is,
confinement without satisfying the minimum substantive requirements. Third,
60. Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971).
61. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 708-09 (1976).
62. Thus, the Court once noted that a child has some sort of interest in avoiding the stigma of
abnormal behavior in public. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 601 (1979) ("[W]hat is truly 'stigmatizing'
is the symptomatology of a mental or emotional illness. . .. A person needing, but not receiving,
appropriate medical care may well face even greater social ostracism .... ).
63. See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't. of Social Serv., 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989)
("[T]he Due Process clauses generally confer no affirmative right to government aid, even where such
aid may be necessary to secure life, liberty, or property interests of which the government itself may
not deprive the individual.").
64. Damage to reputation accompanied by a loss in future education or employment opportunities
could be a deprivation of liberty. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574-75 (1975) (disciplinary
action in school setting constituted deprivation of liberty because it would damage student's future
educational and employment opportunities). Absent affirmative action taken by the state to impose
such additional damage, though, it is unlikely that failure to commit and treat is a deprivation of
reputational liberty.
65. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 601 (1979) ("protectible interest ... in not being labeled
erroneously by some persons because of an improper decision" (emphasis added)); S.H. v. Edwards,
860 F.2d 1045, 1050 (11th Cir. 1988) (per curiam) ("[T]he right not to be inappropriately stigmatized by
hospitalization is a protectible interest under the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause." (district
court's order appended to Court of Appeals opinion, relying on Parham) (emphasis added)).
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and critically, even a correct adjudication of mental illness so severe that it
warrants state intervention (on the person's own behalf or for the protection of
society) has a profound impact on the individual's status in the community. The
Court made precisely this point in 1979, noting that "commitment to a mental
hospital 'can engender adverse social consequences to the individual' and that
'[w]hether we label this phenomena 'stigma' or choose to call it something else,
... we recognize that it can occur and that it can have a very significant impact
on the individual."'66  And while commitment to outpatient status may
engender less severe "social consequences," it unquestionably engenders some.
c. Conclusion. The North Carolina outpatient commitment scheme
implicates a liberty interest in freedom, though to a lesser extent than any
inpatient civil commitment scheme, and possibly to a lesser extent than other
outpatient commitment schemes. This infringement is enhanced, at least to
some extent, by the "stigma" of the commitment process. Critically, though, the
deprivation of liberty involved here is considerably less than in the inpatient
schemes reviewed by the Court.
3. The State's Interest. Identifying the liberty interests infringed upon by
preventive commitment, and the extent to which they are infringed, is only the
first step of substantive review. Only sufficiently weighty state interests will
justify the infringement. North Carolina's interest seems fairly clear: The
scheme is designed to, and does, prevent hospitalization of revolving door
patients, effect lesser deprivations, and reduce state expenses.67 And its power
to enact such a scheme is not in doubt: This is an exercise of both its police
power (because outpatients are, by definition, on the very brink of dangerous-
ness) and its role as parens patriae (because outpatients are, by definition,
limited in their ability to make treatment decisions).'
Both the police power and the parens patriae role are legitimate premises for
state action. However, a police power justification is more convincing in the
inpatient setting than in the outpatient setting, as inpatients have been
adjudicated dangerous, while outpatients have not. The parens patriae rationale
66. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 492 (1980) (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425-26
(1979)).
67. See Gunn, supra note 55, at 19-20.
68. To be sure, the state's interest is preventive and, as such, deprives the individual of liberty on
the basis of the possibility that he would become dangerous absent treatment. To the extent that it
works from possibility rather than certainty, the North Carolina scheme will be overbroad (though not
necessarily unconstitutionally so). That is, some of those deprived would not, in fact, have become
dangerous. Still, similarly broad juvenile curfews have been justified on preventive grounds and
sustained at the court of appeals level. See, e.g., Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488 (5th Cir. 1993). In fact,
the Qutb court sustained a juvenile curfew even while applying "strict scrutiny." The state's interests
were deemed unusually compelling, since the persons affected were minors "whose immaturity,
inexperience, and lack of judgment may sometimes impair their ability to exercise their rights wisely."
Id. at 492 (citing Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 444 (1990)). This analysis suggests that
preventive commitment in North Carolina will survive the less rigorous scrutiny to which it must be
subjected. See supra text accompanying notes 47-53.
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may, thus, take on greater significance in the outpatient setting. This is entirely
consistent with the Jackson reasonable relationship rule: The state's authority
to commit to outpatient status is largely parens patriae-precisely what one
would expect of a scheme that is primarily about treatment.69
4. No Right to Least Restrictive Means. If due process requires that the
state merely design a reasonable commitment scheme, then "least restrictive
means" analysis (a hallmark of strict scrutiny, the least deferential form of
judicial review) is unwarranted. Still, plaintiffs arguing for training and
habilitation" in the inpatient setting, as well as plaintiffs seeking outpatient
placement (instead of inpatient confinement) have couched their arguments in
terms of a least restrictive means requirement,71 and several U.S. courts of
appeals have applied that standard. The Supreme Court has not spoken directly
on the topic, 72 however, and the courts of appeals using least restrictive means
analysis have misapplied the analagous precedent.
While some lower courts have relied on Youngberg v. Romeo73 for a
definitive answer on the appropriateness of least restrictive means analysis in
the civil commitment setting,74 their reliance on the case is misplaced. The
Youngberg Court simply did not address the question. Rather, the Court held
only that a committed mentally retarded individual is entitled to the training
reasonably required by his constitutionally protected interests in reasonably safe
conditions of confinement and freedom from unreasonable bodily restraints. 75
The Court recognized that some training of the patient by the state might be
logically necessary in order to prevent deprivation of identified constitutional
interests, but it construed this as an application of the Jackson reasonable
69. See APA REPORT, supra note 6, at 21 (suggesting outpatient commitment "be based on a need
for treatment rather than on protection of the patient or others from dangerous behavior"). The parens
patriae power finds its origin in the sovereign's authority to act as the "general guardian of all infants,
idiots, and lunatics." Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 257 (1972). The Court has suggested
that this power inheres in the modem state, and the power has been invoked to justify civil commitment
since at least 1845. See Comment, Developments in the Law-Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87
HARV. L. REV. 1190, 1207-10 (1974).
70. The Court uses "habilitation" and "training" interchangeably; each refers to the "development
of needed skills." See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 316-17 (1982).
71. See, e.g., S.H. v. Edwards, 860 F.2d 1045 (11th Cir. 1988) (mentally retarded persons arguing
for community placement on the basis of a least restrictive environment requirement).
72. See Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71,118 n.12, 119 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting that
the Court has never applied strict scrutiny to state laws involving involuntary civil confinement).
73. 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
74. See, e.g., S.H. v. Edwards, 860 F.2d 1045, 1046 (11th Cir. 1988) (per curiam) ("[O]n the one
issue of whether the [mentally retarded] plaintiffs have a substantive due process right, under the
federal constitution, to habilitation in a community setting[,] ... [a]ll agree that Youngberg v. Romeo
is the guiding light but reasonable litigants, attorneys, and judges disagree on its application." (citations
omitted)); Association for Retarded Citizens v. Olson, 561 F. Supp. 473,486 (D.N.D. 1982) ("While the
Youngberg decision does not directly address this specific right, the Court's analysis indicates that it
would reject an absolute right to the least restrictive alternatives.").
75. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 322 (choosing "reasonable" standard so as not to burden state
institutions unduly and so as not to restrict the exercise of professional judgment).
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relation rule.76 The Court did not explicitly endorse a substantive entitlement
to training." Nor did it endorse a substantive entitlement to commitment in
the least restrictive setting. Instead, as several courts of appeals have correctly
interpreted the case, Youngberg requires the state only to provide habilitation
consistent with prevailing standards of practice.7"
By and large, courts ruling recently have not applied least restrictive means
analysis to due process challenges of state schemes of civil commitment,79 and
the traditional deference generally accorded to the states and to mental health
professionals in this context strongly suggests that strict scrutiny of North
Carolina's preventive commitment statutes would be inappropriate. This
conclusion, combined with the premise that "mental illness" and "dangerous-
76. See id. at 324; Olson, 561 F. Supp. at 486 (Pursuant to Youngberg, a "constitutional right to the
least restrictive method of care or treatment exists only insofar as professional judgment determines that
such alternatives would measurably enhance the resident's enjoyment of basic liberty interests."); see
also Clark v. Cohen, 794 F.2d 79 (3d Cir. 1986) (ordering community placement for a particular
individual for precisely this reason); Bruce A. Arrigo, The Logic of Identity and the Politics of Justice:
Establishing a Right to Community-Based Treatment for the Institutionalized Mentally Disabled, 18 NEW
ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 1, 6-9 (1992) (dividing post-Youngberg decisions into two
groups, those that "[dismiss] all claims to a constitutionally-based right to community-situated treatment
for the psychiatrically disabled" and those that "[equate] minimally adequate treatment with
community-based services," consistent with "the consensus of the medical profession"); Seicshnaydre,
supra note 12, at 1981-83 (arguing that there may be a right to community placement consistent with
Youngberg if professional judgment deems outpatient placement thebetter course of treatment).
77. Although three concurring justices were prepared to consider the possibility of an independent
constitutional claim to the training or habilitation needed to preserve self-care skills, they reasoned from
a perceived additional loss of liberty. See Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 327 (Blackmun, J., with whom
Brennan, J., and O'Connor, J.. joined, concurring).
78. See, e.g., S.H. v. Edwards, 860 F.2d 1045, 1046 (11th Cir. 1988); Society for Good Will to
Retarded Children v. Cuomo, 737 F.2d 1239, 1248 (2d Cir. 1984); Philips v. Thompson, 715 F.2d 365,
368 (7th Cir. 1983). The Youngberg decision addressed the issue with respect to commitment of the
mentally retarded, not the mentally ill, but the distinction has not been explored in the cases pertaining
to either. The framework of analysis should not differ. But see Mary C. McCarron, Comment, The
Right to Refuse Antipsychotic Drugs: Safeguarding the Mentally Incompetent Patient's Right to
Procedural Due Process, 73 MARQ. L. REV. 477, 509 (1990) (arguing that there are relevant differences
between the mentally ill and the mentally retarded, such as the permanence of the impairment, such
that, for example, Youngberg's deferential professional judgment standard for treatment of the mentally
retarded might not translate to the context of the mentally ill).
79. Compare Lynch v. Baxley, 744 F.2d 1452, 1459 (11th Cir. 1984) (noting that ."the least
restrictive alternative consistent with the legitimate purposes of a commitment inheres in the very
nature of civil commitment"' (quoting Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617, 623 (D.C. Cir. 1969))) and
Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (noting that court should consider alternative courses
of treatment for "insane" petitioner who posed no danger to others) with Lelsz v. Kavanagh, 807 F.2d
1243, 1251 (5th Cir. 1987) (noting that "the federal constitution does not confer on [the mentally
retarded] a right to habilitation in the least restrictive environment") and Society for Good Will to
Retarded Children v. Cuomo, 737 F.2d 1239, 1249 (2d Cir. 1984) ("More generally, post-Youngberg
courts have held that there is no constitutional right to a 'least restrictive environment."') and Johnson
v. Brejle, 701 F.2d 1201, 1210 (7th Cir. 1983) ("Due process... does not guarantee [criminal defendants
found unfit to stand trial and assigned to a mental health center] the right to be treated in the least
restrictive environment that money can buy.") and Rennie v. Klein, 720 F.2d 266,269-271 (3d Cir. 1983)
(en banc) (plurality and concurring opinions) (noting that a "least intrusive means" test should not be
applied to an examination of New Jersey's regulations for treating the mentally ill). See also Clark v.
Cohen, 794 F.2d 79, 87 (3d Cir. 1986) (ordering community placement of mentally retarded plaintiff
because of the "unanimous professional opinion that she should be placed in a far less restrictive
environment" (emphasis added)).
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ness" may not always be required for inpatient hospitalization, suggests that
preventive commitment treatment providers may have more flexibility under the
federal Constitution than they currently exercise in North Carolina. Perhaps,
for example, the Constitution would permit them to move a noncompliant
outpatient, who is rapidly spiralling toward dangerousness, into an inpatient
facility, at least briefly.8'
5. The Reasonable Relationship Rule. While the Court has not ruled on
outpatient commitment of any sort, it applied the reasonable relationship rule
to inpatient civil commitment in O'Connor v. Donaldson.8 The O'Connor
holding, when combined with a subsequent pair of cases on the commitment of
criminal defendants found "not guilty by reason of insanity" ("NGRI"), strongly
suggests that North Carolina's preventive commitment scheme would satisfy the
reasonable relationship rule and, accordingly, be sustained against a due process
challenge.
a. Inpatient commitment. Although he was not dangerous, Kenneth
Donaldson had been confined for "custodial care" alone (not for treatment)82
for fifteen years. He was clearly capable of surviving in a community setting,
and several persons had offered to assume custody. Indeed, there was even
some doubt as to whether he was mentally ill. Putting aside that question, and
applying Jackson, the Court held that if he were not dangerous, he could not be
confined for custodial care alone. Specifically, there was no rational link
between the basis of his commitment (at most, mental illness) and its nature
(custodial).
While O'Connor is cited for the broad rule that involuntary inpatient civil
commitment of an adult requires a showing of mental illness and dangerous-
ness,8 3 subsequent rulings by the Court on the commitment of criminal
defendants found NGRI' suggest that the case should be read more narrowly.
In the first case, Jones v. United States,85 a narrow majority of the Court held
that a criminal defendant committed in the District of Columbia on a finding of
NGRI need not be released at the end of what would otherwise have been his
sentence. An individual found NGRI, presumably both mentally ill and
dangerous, is committed as any other committee would be, both for his own
treatment and for the protection of society. As the duration of commitment
80. This detention would almost certainly have to be brief. See Barrera-Echavarria v. Rison, 21
F.3d 314, 316 (9th Cir. 1994) ("In sustaining statutes in the very few and limited situations in which
preventive detention is permissible in the United States, the U.S. Supreme Court has stressed the crucial
role of time.").
81. 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
82. See id. at 569 ("Donaldson's confinement was a simple regime of enforced custodial care, not
a program designed to alleviate or cure his supposed illness.").
83. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 374 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (writing of
the "Addington burden of proof" and the "O'Connor elements").
84. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992); Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 (1982).
85. 463 U.S. 354 (1982).
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must be reasonably related to its purpose,8 6 the individual may be confined
until one of these criteria is no longer satisfied.
The problem that fractured the Court in Jones was that after a criminal
defendant is found NGRI, the D.C. Code mandates inpatient civil commitment
without mention of the substantive criteria enunciated in O'Connor.87 The
majority and dissent disagreed about how (and even whether) a leap from
NGRI to "mentally ill and dangerous" was made. Indeed, because it considered
the O'Connor elements controlling, the dissent raised concerns about the
rationality of the leap at all. Specifically the dissent noted that a person found
NGRI is found to have been mentally ill and dangerous only at a particular
moment in the past. Civil commitment hearings, by way of contrast, are
"forward looking."88 Moreover, the criminal law in the District of Columbia
requires a finding that the mental illness "caused" the act; although the majority
viewed this as supporting an inference of an illness so serious it is likely to
continue," the dissent viewed the finding of causation in the criminal context
as a social judgment, not a medical judgment, and thus inappropriate in the
context of civil commitment. 90
Very recently the Court revisited the issue. Ten years had passed since
Jones, and the scale now tipped in the other direction. This time, in Foucha v.
Louisiana, the Court invalidated a Louisiana scheme under which a person
found NGRI would remain committed until he proved he was no longer
dangerous, even if he regained his sanity.91 The four justices dissenting in
Foucha (Kennedy, Rehnquist, Thomas, and Scalia) emphasized that both Jones
and Foucha were criminal proceedings and contended that a criminal defendant
found NGRI is more like a convicted criminal than a candidate for civil
commitment.92 Indeed, in Foucha, the state had already proved the criminal
act beyond a reasonable doubt.93 In other words, the O'Connor elements
would be inappropriate. These justices construed Jones as an endorsement of
86. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
87. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-301(j) (1981) (criminal defendant may be acquitted by reason of
insanity if insanity established by preponderance of the evidence); id. § 24-301(d)(1) ("If any person
... is acquitted solely on the ground that he was insane. . . he shall be committed to a hospital for the
mentally ill."). Jones pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity, which the government did not contest,
and the parties stipulated to the facts. Jones, 463 U.S. at 360. The Court's holding must be narrowly
construed to apply only when the burdens of proof and elements proven match those of the D.C. Code;
as the dissent pointed out, "[iln some jurisdictions,. . . an acquittal by reason of insanity may mean only
that a jury found a reasonable doubt as to a defendant's sanity and as to the causal relationship
between his mental condition and his crime." Id. at 377 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
88. See Jones, 463 U.S. at 377 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 366 (majority opinion).
90. Id. at 381 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
91. 504 U.S. 71 (1992).
92. Id at 90, 94-95, 108. See also the majority opinion in Jones, 463 U.S. at 367 (noting "important
differences between the class of potential civil-commitment candidates and the class of insanity
acquittees that justify differing standards of proof").
93. On the other hand, the state did not contend that Foucha was criminally responsible or that it
was entitled to punish him as a criminal. Nor did the Louisiana NGRI statute so provide. See Foucha,
504 U.S. at 74 n.1.
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the distinction between civil and criminal commitment, and viewed the Foucha
rule (that commitment of a person found NGRI must still be-at all
times-predicated on both mental illness and dangerousness) as effectively
overruling Jones.94
So, while the dissent in Jones had expressed concern about any commitment
premised solely on a finding of NGRI, what is thought of as the "conservative
bloc" in the Court (dissenting in the more recent Foucha case) would sustain a
statutory scheme confining a criminal defendant after a finding of NGRI,
possibly even indefinitely and for dangerousness alone.95 To be sure, the
dissent in Foucha is precisely that-a dissent. But it underlines a fundamental
point about the Jackson holding, which remains good law: What constitutes a
"reasonable relationship" necessarily varies from scheme to scheme. As the
state's purpose and basis for action change, the nature and duration of
commitment may also change. The narrow interpretation of O'Connor (that if
an adult is not dangerous, he cannot be confined for custodial care alone) is thus
more consistent with the Jackson reasonable relation rule, as well as with the
deference usually accorded to state-by-state experimentation in mental health
matters.
96
b. Preventive commitment. North Carolina's preventive commitment
scheme falls within an area the O'Connor Court explicitly left unexplored. That
is, the O'Connor Court did not address (1) whether a dangerous mentally ill
person has a right to treatment upon compulsory confinement (whether
Donaldson's "custodial" commitment would have been constitutional if he had
also been dangerous) and (2) whether the state can confine a nondangerous
mentally ill person simply for the purpose of treatment (whether Donaldson's
commitment would have been constitutional if they had been treating him).'
If the state could have kept Donaldson by treating him, even though he was not
dangerous, then even some forms of inpatient commitment may not require a
showing of mental illness and dangerousness. And that suggests the lower
94. See id. at 90, 94-95 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Pursuant to Foucha, commitment of a person
found NGRI must terminate as soon as he is either sane or not dangerous. In other words, both prongs
(mental illness and dangerousness) must at all times be satisfied for continuing commitment to be
constitutional. The Foucha Court qualified this by noting that it had previously approved pretrial
detention premised on dangerousness alone, provided the crime was serious, the government's interests
were overwhelming, detention followed a full-blown' adversary hearing with a neutral decisionmaker,
and a finding by clear and convincing evidence that no conditions of release would assure the safety
of the detainee or the community, the duration was strictly limited, and the detainee was kept
separately from persons awaiting or serving sentences. Id. at 80-83 (citing United States v. Salerno, 481
U.S. 739 (1987)).
95. See id. at 87-88 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[I]t might ... be permissible for Louisiana to
confine an insanity acquittee who has regained sanity if ... the nature and duration of detention were
tailored to reflect pressing public safety concerns related to the acquittee's continuing dangerousness.").
96. See Karen Matteson, Comment, Involuntary Civil Commitment: The Inadequacy of Existing
Procedural and Substantive Protections, 28 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 906, 918-21 (1981) (narrow reading of
O'Connor).
97. The Court did not address these questions because the questions were not before the Court.
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threshold of preventive commitment may well pass constitutional muster. It
remains to be seen, however, exactly how the Jackson rule will apply to the
North Carolina scheme.
Again, due process requires a reasonable relationship between (1) the nature
and duration of commitment and (2) its purpose and basis. The purpose of the
North Carolina scheme is to treat a portion of the mentally ill popula-
tion-those who are not yet dangerous-in order to prevent their otherwise
inevitable dangerousness. In other words, in North Carolina, the individual's
need for treatment is the statutory justification for preventive commitment. So,
in North Carolina, a constitutionally protected right to treatment might be a
logical extension of the reasonable relationship rule.
The Supreme Court has noted that, "as a general matter, a state is under no
constitutional duty to provide substantive services for those within its
border."98 Thus, ordinarily there is no right to treatment by the state. Some
lower courts, however, have reasoned that treatment must be provided on
account of an implicit quid pro quo in the Due Process Clause. In this view, the
state, in return for the liberty deprivation, must offer treatment as compensa-
tion. Thus, as one lower court reasoned, "[i]f an individual, adult or child,
healthy or ill, is confined by the government for some reason other than his
commission of a criminal offense, the state must provide some benefit to the
individual in return for the deprivation of his liberty."99
While fundamentally different in its view of the relationship between state
and individual, the more commonly articulated view of due process-that any
deprivation of liberty requires a sufficiently weighty countervailing state
interest-results in this instance in the same outcome. The state interest
justifying a deprivation of liberty might be punishment, deterrence, and the
safety of others (as in the exercise of police power to incarcerate a convicted
criminal), or it might be the individual's need for treatment (under the parens
patriae power). If the state's interest is the latter, application of the Jackson
reasonable relationship rule would result in a "right to treatment." In other
words, whether or not one applies a quid pro quo analysis, treatment is the only
reasonable option in North Carolina since the nature of confinement must be
reasonably related to its purpose." The North Carolina statute does require
98. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 317 (1982).
99. Gary v. Louisiana, 437 F. Supp. 1209, 1216 (E.D. La. 1976); see also S.H. v. Edwards, 860 F.2d
1045, 1059 (l1th Cir. 1988) (Clark, J., dissenting); Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305, 1314 (5th Cir.
1974).
100. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 326 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("If a state
[commits] a mentally retarded person... for 'care and treatment,'.., due process might well bind the
state to ensure that the conditions of his commitment bear some reasonable relation to ... those goals.
... [C]ommitment without any 'treatment' . . . would not bear a reasonable relation to the purposes
of the person's confinement."); see also Woe v. Cuomo, 729 F.2d 96, 105 (2d Cir. 1984) (noting that if
the justification for commitment rests on the patient's need for care, the reasonable relationship rule
provides a right to treatment); David W. Burgett, Comment, Substantive Due Process Limits on the
Duration of Civil Commitment for the Treatment of Mental Illness, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 205,
215-16 (1981) (substantive due process requires that treatment be provided and effective, for therapeutic
Page 251: Spring 1995]
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 58: No. 2
the district court judge to make a finding at the preventive commitment hearing
that outpatient treatment is, in fact, available.1"' The state has thus taken
steps to address the possibility that, without medical treatment, preventive
commitment might be irrational.
At the same time, however, preventive commitment usually entails an
involuntary medication order (albeit "coerced" instead of "forced" medication),
which raises the question of whether or to what extent the patient may refuse
precisely that medication to which he has a "right." Ordinarily, the individual
has a liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted administration of psychotropic
drugs.0 2 Administration of psychotropic drugs to prison inmates and inpa-
tients, for example, impairs a liberty interest beyond the deprivation effected by
the original conviction or commitment.0 3
custody to satisfy Jackson).
Similarly, a mentally ill but easily curable criminal defendant committed (pending trial) on a finding
of incompetence might successfully argue that the Jackson rule mandated precisely that treatment
necessary to restore his competence. On the other hand, although the state may not confine the
nondangerous for custodial purposes alone (O'Connor), once a mentally ill person is dangerous,
conceivably the Jackson rule could be satisfied by custodial care. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S.
306, 325-26 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("Under [the Jackson] standard, a State could accept a
person for 'safekeeping,' then constitutionally refuse to provide him treatment. In such a case,
commitment without treatment would bear a reasonable relation to the goal for which the person was
confined."); see also Association for Retarded Citizens v. Olson, 561 F. Supp. 473, 488 (D.N.D. 1982)
("[lIt is reasonable to believe that the state may have a compelling interest in just safekeeping-rather
than habilitating-[the] mentally retarded. . . from injuries that would result to themselves, and others,
if the mentally retarded were not so confined."). Each of these very different propositions (for different
situations) flows equally from the Jackson reasonable relation rule.
101. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-271(b)(4) (1994).
102. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221 (1990) ("[R]espondent possesses a significant liberty
interest in avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs."); see also Vitek v. Jones, 445
U.S. 480, 491-94 (1980). "Psychotropic drugs" includes medications for depression ("anti-depressants")
and medications for psychosis such as schizophrenia ("anti-psychotics"). See McCarron, supra note 78,
at 480 n.22 (reviewing the various psychotropic drugs).
103. Even though criminal conviction involves the most rigorous process the state can provide, the
new action of administering drugs implicates a liberty interest not adequately protected by the original
process (i.e., the substantive constitutional limitations on the new intrusion are wholly different from
those on the old), so the Due Process Clause requires additional substantive and procedural protections.
See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990) (applying due process analysis to prison regulation
regarding the administration of antipsychotic drugs to prisoners); Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236,
242 (1976) ("As long as the conditions or degree of confinement to which the prisoner is subjected is
within the sentence imposed upon him and is not otherwise violative of the Constitution, the Due
Process Clause does not in itself subject an inmate's treatment by prison authorities to judicial
oversight.").
Transfer to a prison hospital would be another example of a totally new "type" of intrusion. See,
e.g., Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980) (transfer from prison to prison hospital requires administrative
process that complies with due process); Baugh v. Woodard, 604 F. Supp. 1529 (E.D.N.C. 1985) (state
prisoner has liberty interest in not being involuntarily transferred to mental health facility and due
process requires pre-transfer notice and hearing as well as an adviser and an impartial decisionmaker),
vacated in part, 808 F.2d 333 (4th Cir. 1987) (hearing can be after transfer and before admission, but
only because psychiatric treatment does not commence until after admission).
By way of contrast, administrative segregation and transfer to a different penal facility may not
require new process. See, e.g., Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238 (1983) (transfer from state prison in
Hawaii to state prison in California); Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236 (1976) (transfer to a different
prison facility); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976) (transfer to maximum security prison). To be
sure, in these situations, the state might have created a new liberty interest, thus triggering a
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While there is unquestionably an interest in avoiding unwanted medication,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit shed some light on the limits
of that interest in the 1980s.1" In 1987, the court held that forcible medication
of a defendant institutionalized after a finding of incompetence to stand trial
requires an initial finding of "medical incompetence" and a procedure pursuant
to which the state can decide if and how to treat the defendant. Such a
procedure might be substituted judgment (where the decisionmaker determines
what the patient would do if he were competent), deference to professional
judgment, or some sort of "best interests" test. 5 On rehearing in 1988,
however, a different panel of the Fourth Circuit concluded that any distinction
between competence to stand trial and competence to make treatment decisions
"must certainly be one of such subtlety and complexity as to tax perception by
the most skilled medical or psychiatric professionals."1 6  To require a
preliminary finding of medical incompetence would be to "pose an unavoidable
risk of completely anomalous, perhaps flatly inconsistent, determinations of
mental incompetence by different judicial tribunals."'" Thus the court
approved a process, proposed by the government, that construed the decision
to medicate as essentially "medical" and that placed decisional responsibility in
the hands of medical personnel at the custodial institution."°
While the Supreme Court denied certiorari on the Fourth Circuit case, it
implicitly aligned itself with the second panel and cast doubts on any widespread
applicability of a notion of "medical incompetence.''t°9 In Washington v.
Harper, an inmate who had become mentally ill while incarcerated argued that
the state "[could] not override his choice to refuse antipsychotic drugs unless he
ha[d] been found to be incompetent, and then only if the factfinder makes a
substituted judgment that he, if competent, would consent to drug treat-
ment."' l  The Court disagreed."' Instead, according to the Court, "given
the requirements of the prison environment, the Due Process Clause permits the
state to treat a prison inmate who has a serious mental illness with antipsychotic
requirement of procedural protections. See, e.g., Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983) (if a state by
statute or administrative action declares prisoners to be entitled to a hearing before transfer into
administrative segregation or to another penal facility, the state has given those prisoners an interest
protected by the due process clause).
104. See United States v. Charters, 829 F.2d 479 (4th Cir. 1987), reheard and remanded, 863 F.2d 302
(4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1016 (1990).
105. See id. at 494-97 (explaining medical incompetence); id. at 495 ("'In almost every state the
mentally disabled person is considered competent unless there is a separate hearing declaring him
incompetent."' (quoting S. BRAKEL ET AL., THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 341 n.167 (3d
ed. 1985) (emphasis added))); id. at 488 ("Mentally ill patients, though incapacitated for particular
purposes, can be competent to make decisions concerning their medical care.").
106. 863 F.2d at 310.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 307; see also id. at 312 ("We do not believe that adequate protection here requires
substitution of the pre-medication adjudication regime proposed by Charters.").
109. See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
110. Id. at 222.
111. Id.
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drugs against his will, if the inmate is dangerous to himself or others and the
treatment is in the inmate's medical interest.""1 2 The Court thus required no
finding of incompetence. For forcible medication in the prison environment, at
least, a lesser showing by the state will suffice.
North Carolina requires the state district court judge, working from the
recommendations of examining physicians, to find the patient limited in his
ability to make, or simply unable to make, an informed decision to seek
voluntary treatment or to comply with recommended treatment."3 While
"incompetent to stand trial" is not the same thing as "incompetent to make
treatment decisions," arguably "limited in the ability to make (or flatly unable
to make) treatment decisions" is. Moreover, to require an additional finding of
incompetence to make treatment decisions might be to ask the wrong
question. 4 Insofar as the mentally ill share as a symptom of their disease a
tendency not to take their medicine, 5 the appropriate question might be
medical and diagnostic rather than legal (and, specifically, constitutional). In
other words, if this subset of the population is prone, by virtue of their disease,
to passivity, a rigorous interpretation of "incompetence" may well be conceptu-
ally inappropriate for them."6
With respect to the procedure pursuant to which the state makes a treatment
decision, it remains unclear if any of the three options outlined by the first
Fourth Circuit panel would be appropriate in the context of preventive
commitment. Several courts of appeals have applied least restrictive means
analysis, required an overwhelming state interest, or otherwise closely
112. ld at 227.
113. Indeed, district court judges in North Carolina uphold physicians' recommendations in 96% of
all civil commitment cases. Swartz Interview, supra note 10.
114. See Joseph T. Carney, Comment, America's Mentally Ill" Tormented Without Treatment, 3 GEO.
MASON U. Civ. RTs. L.J. 181 (1992) ("Dr. Thomas Szasz and civil liberties attorneys ... argue that,
in a society where people are free to smoke, drink, climb mountains or race cars, people should be free
to do as they wish with their bodies as long as nobody else is harmed."). For thoughtful review of
tension between liberty and the need for treatment, see Nancy K. Rhoden, The Limits of Liberty:
Deinstitutionalization, Homelessness, and Libertarian Theory, 31 EMORY L.J. 375 (1982).
115. Swartz Interview, supra note 10 (suggesting this is a symptom of the mental illnesses common
to outpatients). But see Gerard R. Kelly et al., Utility of the Health Belief Model in Examining
Medication Compliance Among Psychiatric Outpatients, 25 Soc. Sc. MED. 1205, 1209 (1987) ("[W]hile
there has been an inclination on the part of many researchers to view psychiatric patients as unreliable,
incompetent, and unable to hold rational views and beliefs concerning their illnesses and disabilities,
[we have concluded that] psychiatric outpatients do hold distinct and even realistic beliefs and
perceptions regarding the extent of their illnesses and the ways in which they are viewed by others
around them.").
116. Swartz Interview, supra note 10. Joseph Carney makes the same point:
In protecting the patient's procedural and substantive due process rights, [civil libertarians] are
protecting his right to choose treatment or not. However, the affected individual is unable to
make a rational decision. . . . The unfortunate irony is that the illness' symptomatology,
irrational or distorted thinking, allows the disease to perpetuate itself because the law requires
society to respect the patient's irrational decisions.
Carney, supra note 114.
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scrutinized decisions to medicate the inpatient and the inmate forcibly."7 The
Supreme Court, however, has suggested this heightened standard of review
might not be necessary. For example, in 1981, the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court held that a noninstitutionalized but mentally ill person had a
protected liberty interest in refusing treatment with antipsychotic drugs and,
applying rigorous scrutiny, required a countervailing "overwhelming state
interest" in order to medicate forcibly."' 8 The U.S. Supreme Court noted in
a case the same year that this decision was based on the common law of
Massachusetts as well as the federal constitution, and suggested that the rigorous
scrutiny applied by Massachusetts might be more than the federal constitution
requires."9
More importantly, in the preventive commitment setting, psychotropic
medication is not per se forced. That is to say, in the paradigm due process
involuntary medication case, the institutionalized or incarcerated individual is
physically administered psychotropic medication, by force if necessary. By way
of contrast, North Carolina outpatients are merely ordered to take their
medicine, and then psychologically coerced."2 Arguably, the liberty interest
in avoiding coerced treatment with psychotropic drugs is weaker than the liberty
interest in avoiding forced administration of psychotropic drugs. To be sure, the
drugs mandated by the state, whether forced or coerced, are equally mentally
and physically intrusive.' 2' The coercion process, however, leaves available
the choice of noncompliance (and concomitant penalty). Combined with the
117. See United States v. Charters, 829 F.2d 479, 497 (4th Cir. 1987) (opting for "substituted
judgment" approach for forcible medication of mentally ill pretrial detainee); id. (forcible medication
of incompetent pretrial detainee sufficiently intrudes into fundamental liberties that the state must
explore less restrictive alternatives); Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387, 1396 (10th Cir. 1984) ("(L]ess
restrictive alternatives ... should be ruled out before resorting to antipsychotic drugs."), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1214 (1985).
118. See In re Guardianship of Roe, 421 N.E.2d 40, 51 (Mass. 1981).
119. See Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 303 (1982) ("Especially in the wake of Roe, it is distinctly
possible that Massachusetts recognizes liberty interests of persons adjudged incompetent that are
broader than those protected directly by the Constitution of the United States."). But see Bee v.
Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387, 1396 (10th Cir. 1984) (expressing caution about application of deferential
standard to forcible medication), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1214 (1985); Rennie v. Klein, 720 F.2d 266 (3d
Cir. 1983) (same).
120. See Virginia Aldigd Hiday, Coercion in Civil Commitment: Process, Preferences, and Outcome,
15 INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 359, 363 (1992) ("[Cjlinicians pointed out to patients the likelihood of
getting sick again and being rehospitalized if they failed to take their medicine or come to therapy.
Many clinicians called these tactics 'threats,' and thought them important in obtaining compliance."
(citations omitted)). The threat of contempt sanctions would be another coercive measure. See infra
text accompanying notes 136-43.
121. The mind-altering nature and potential long-term effects of psychotropic drugs suggest that they
may be at least as intrusive as inpatient commitment. Cf United States v. Charters, 829 F.2d 479, 489
(4th Cir. 1987) ("There is... no principled distinction between the chemical invasion of drug therapy
and the mechanical invasion of surgery."); In re Guardianship of Roe, 421 N.E.2d 40, 60 (Mass. 1981)
(At least if public safety is the reason for the treatment, "antipsychotic drugs function as chemical
restraints forcibly imposed upon an unwilling individual who, if competent, would refuse such treatment.
Examined in terms of personal liberty, such an infringement is at least the equal of involuntary
commitment to a State hospital. Accordingly, we think that the same standard of proof is applicable
in both involuntary commitment and involuntary medication proceedings.").
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fact that the basic concept of the scheme seems quite reasonable (revolving door
patients are, by definition, safe if they take their medicine), this less intrusive
medication process probably satisfies substantive due process.
IV
APPLICATION OF THE STATUTES
A. Noncompliance
Although a respondent under an outpatient commitment order has been
ordered to receive outpatient treatment, the statute does not permit forced
medication or detention for treatment. 22 Noncompliance thus poses the
greatest practical challenge to North Carolina's preventive commitment
scheme.12 Quite a few researchers evaluating the North Carolina preventive
commitment scheme have distinguished between "situational" and "contuma-
cious" noncompliance,124 defining the former as noncompliance "due to social
and illness factors,""12 and finding it much more common. That is, "patients
could not get transportation to the mental health center, could not afford the
cost of medicine and treatment, had little family support in pursuing care and
staying on medication regimes, denied their illnesses and/or lacked understand-
ing of their need for medicine and care.""12 This distinction between "contu-
macious" noncompliance and "situational" noncompliance may be artificial, as
mentally ill individuals often share, as a symptom of their disease, a tendency
not to take their medicine."2 7 Noncompliance with treatment regimens is a
universal problem, common to all diseases (mental and otherwise) as well as to
all demographic and social groups."2 But it is quite unclear to what extent
patients with chronic mental diseases are more prone than other patients to fail
122. The outpatient statutes explicitly forbid forcible medication. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-273(a)(3)
(1994). The legislature had determined that a provision for forcible medication would be unnecessary,
because noncompliance tends to result from "situational" factors such as transportation. APA REPORT,
supra note 6, at 11. While the North Carolina mental health statutes allow emergency forced
medication of involuntarily committed clients, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-57(e) (1994), and the
accompanying regulations both define "emergency" and explain the procedures, N.C. ADMIN. CODE
tit. 10, 14J .0400 (Mar. 1990) ("Refusal of Psychotropic Medication"), these provisions cannot be read
as authorizing forcible medication of outpatients. The language is simply inconsistent with the
outpatient context. See, e.g., id. ("When a client in a state facility refuses psychotropic medication.. 
(emphasis added)).
123. APA REPORT, supra note 6, at 12 (in a six-month period, 50% of 295 respondents either
refused medication or otherwise failed to comply (citing Hiday & Scheid-Cook, Critical Appraisal, supra
note 11, at 215)).
124. Gustavo A. Fernandez & Sylvia Nygard, Impact of Involuntary Outpatient Commitment on the
Revolving-Door Syndrome in North Carolina, 41 HOSP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 1001, 1002 (1990);
Hiday & Scheid-Cook, Critical Appraisal, supra note 11, at 218.
125. Hiday & Scheid-Cook, Critical Appraisal, supra note 11, at 218.
126. Id.
127. Swartz interview, supra note 10.
128. Kelly et al., supra note 115, at 1205. Indeed, the average rate of noncompliance with medical
regimens is 50% across all chronic disorders (psychiatric and other). Id.
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to comply, or to what extent this noncompliance should be considered part of
the disease itself. 29
The statutory mechanism for dealing with refusals draws the distinction
between contumacious and situational noncompliance, but ultimately provides
little in the way of statutory teeth. In fact, the only thing that can be forced on
a noncompliant outpatient under North Carolina law is his presence at an
appointment for the purposes of evaluation. By statute, if a mentally ill person
"fails to comply" or "clearly refuses to comply" with outpatient treatment, his
treatment physician or center must make reasonable efforts to elicit compliance
and then may request a supplemental hearing. 30 The procedures for this
hearing are the same as for outpatient civil commitment hearings. 3' The
court determines whether and why the respondent has failed to comply, and
may then find probable cause for inpatient commitment and order an
examination, alter the outpatient commitment order, or discharge the
respondent.'32 If the respondent "fails to comply" but does not "clearly refuse
to comply," the center can request a clerk (not a magistrate) to issue a custody
order."'33 The respondent is then brought before the outpatient physician or
treatment center, examined, and released." The physician will presumably
try to cajole compliance. If the respondent meets the criteria for inpatient
commitment, proceedings for a new commitment order may be started. 35 In
short, noncompliant outpatients are divided into those who refuse and those
whose failure is instead situational. A custody order cannot be issued for
refusals.
Coercive civil contempt is, at least in theory, an obvious tool for enforcing
the outpatient treatment order, but conceptual problems arise when one tries
to apply the statutory requirements in the context of the mentally ill. In North
Carolina, failure to comply with a valid court order is continuing civil contempt
so long as the order remains in force, the purpose of the order would still be
served by compliance, and the person subject to the order is still "able to
comply." '36 Significantly, disobedience must be willful.37 and the party held
129. Swartz interview, supra note 10.
130. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-273 (1994).
131. See id. § 122C-274.
132. Id.
133. Id. § 122C-273(a).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. § 5A-21. The outpatient doctor or treatment center would swear out an affidavit before a
clerk of court, who would find probable cause (that the respondent will be found in contempt) and then
issue a show cause order and a notice to appear. At the subsequent civil contempt hearing, the court
would determine if the respondent were capable of compliance (taking his medicine) and, if so, would
place him in jail until he complied or sufficiently deteriorated to be committed as an inpatient. If the
respondent failed to appear for the contempt hearing, the court would order arrest, set bond, and
calendar another hearing. See id. § 5A-23.
137. Jones v. Jones, 278 S.E.2d 260 (N.C. Ct. App. 1981); Cox v. Cox, 179 S.E.2d 194 (N.C. Ct. App.
1971).
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in civil contempt must be able to comply.138 One assumes, first, that this
mechanism could be used only in the few situations of noncompliance that are
"contumacious refusal." To the extent that the distinction between "contuma-
cious" and "situational" refusals is artificial,139 the appropriateness of civil
contempt seems doubtful. More importantly, it is unclear what relationship
exists between the ability to comply with a valid court order for contempt
purposes and the earlier finding at the outpatient commitment hearing that the
respondent was limited in his ability to make or simply unable to make an
informed decision to seek voluntary treatment or comply with recommended
treatment. Quite possibly, the condition supporting the limited-ability finding,
to the extent that it suffices for a state-imposed involuntary medication order,
precludes the contempt. At the very least, while he waits in prison on contempt
charges, the patient may well spiral toward the complete relapse that will justify
inpatient hospitalization by North Carolina statute; thus, at some point, he may
cross a threshold into "unable to comply" for contempt purposes.
The court's contempt power also may be inappropriate in this setting
because it threatens to undermine the therapeutic relationship. In fact, a recent
study of compliance and enforcement in North Carolina concluded that, for
essentially this reason, clinicians even tend not to use the weaker enforcement
procedures provided in the civil commitment statutes."4 Rather, they employ
"softer means" such as phone calls and letters."' And, apparently, these more
"traditional means of persuasion" 142 are effective. Thus the North Carolina
Mental Health Study Commission may well have been correct when it
concluded that "social and illness factors, as opposed to recalcitrance, could be
overcome and compliance obtained by the authority of a court order, the
138. Glesner v. Dembrosky, 327 S.E.2d 60 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985).
139. See supra text accompanying note 127.
140. Virginia Aldigd Hiday & Theresa L. Scheid-Cook, Outpatient Commitment for "Revolving
Door" Patients: Compliance and Treatment, 179 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 83, 87 (1991)
[hereinafter Hiday & Scheid-Cook, Compliance].
141. Id.
142. Id. In a 1992 study, researchers noted:
At the first "No Show" these softer methods were relatively effective, for only 38.7% failed
to show a second time. Again phoning and sending letters were the major methods of
handling this situation and were relatively effective: failure to show a third time was reduced
to 22.6%. At the third "No Show" clinicians employed more forceful methods: calling the
sheriff, threatening to call the sheriff, and taking out a new petition for civil commitment. In
the course of outpatient commitment (OPC), clinicians pointed out to patients the likelihood
of getting sick again and being rehospitalized if they failed to take their medicine or come to
therapy. Many clinicians called these tactics "threats," and thought them important in
obtaining compliance.
Hiday, supra note 120, at 363 (citations omitted). To threaten civil contempt (or rather, to warn that
it may become necessary) is to tell the patient that he is deteriorating and that he may deteriorate
sufficiently to justify inpatient hospitalization. While such a "threat" may introduce an adversarial
element to the doctor-patient relationship, it does so considerably less than would a threat of contempt
sanctions (which might well be an empty, and thus deceptive, threat, precisely since drastic deterioration
may preclude application of the contempt statutes).
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strength of a sheriff's pick up and custody, and the extra effort and attention
required of mental health personnel.',
143
Several commentators have further argued that preventive commitment
without judicial enforcement through the contempt power is inappropriately
coercive for a therapeutic relationship. For example, several write that
"chronically mentally ill individuals who are the likely candidates for involuntary
outpatient commitment are generally alienated individuals who perceive the
world as hostile and uncaring" and argue that placing them "into a situation
where their acceptance of treatment becomes another instance in which the
larger society is willing to penalize them for being unattached to regular social
structures will merely perpetuate the cycle of alienation.' 44  Another
commentator notes that "many providers feel that such coercion is inherently
antithetical to the therapeutic process and believe that serious questions exist
regarding the clinical utility of mandatory outpatient treatment.'
' 45
B. Preventive Commitment: The Results
Several studies of outpatient commitment in North Carolina have concluded
that the scheme has not been used much.'" A variety of explanations have
been proffered for this fact, including "ideological resistance" on the part of
community clinicians, that is, less concern for chronic patients as compared with
crisis patients, more obligation felt to the voluntarily committed, and wariness
about the value of psychotropic medication. 47 Some reluctance also can be
attributed to awareness of inappropriate placements,'" as well as to concerns
that the scheme cannot be enforced. 149  The extent to which the scheme is
143. Hiday & Scheid-Cook, Critical Appraisal, supra note 11, at 218; see Hiday & Scheid-Cook,
Follow-up, supra note 17, at 58 (noting that community mental health centers successful with obtaining
compliance had to encourage compliance through aggressive case management).
144. Edward P. Mulvey et al., The Promise and Peril of Involuntary Outpatient Commitment, AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST, June 1987, at 571, 577.
145. KATHLEEN A. MALOY, CRITIQUING THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE: DOES INVOLUNTARY
OUTPATIENT COMMITMENT WORK? 3 (1992).
146. The earliest outpatient commitment statutes in North Carolina, which directly paralleled the
inpatient statutes, were rarely used in the 1970s and accounted for a mere 2.6% of all civil commitment
decisions. Hiday & Scheid-Cook, Critical Appraisal, supra note 11, at 216; see also Fernandez &
Nygard, supra note 124, at 1002. A study covering the period between July 1984 and June 1985
concluded that the new statutes were "not being used much" and that 8.3% of respondents were
ordered to outpatient commitment. Most of this group were brought in under inpatient procedures and
then "stepped down" to outpatient status after the district court hearing. Hiday & Scheid-Cook, Critical
Appraisal, supra note 11, at 219-21. As late as 1992, a study indicated outpatient commitment "still is
receiving only limited use." Hiday, supra note 120, at 368.
147. APA REPORT, supra note 6, at 6-7; see also Robert D. Miller & Paul B. Fiddleman, Outpatient
Commitment.- Treatment in the Least Restrictive Environment, 35 HOSP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY
147 (1984).
148. See APA REPORT, supra note 6, at 6 (noting that a "significant proportion of the commitments
was the result of negotiation between the patient's attorney and the judge, analogous to plea bargaining
in criminal cases").
149. Stefan, supra note 5, at 290 ("Some judges and mental health professionals in North Carolina
refuse to use preventive commitment because they perceive that it cannot be enforced effectively.");
Hiday & Scheid-Cook, Critical Appraisal, supra note 11, at 218.
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used also varies tremendously from county to county across North Carolina,"
at least partly because it requires cooperation between independent entities,
such as the community mental health clinic and the local sheriff's department.
This relationship is clearly critical, and the quality of interaction varies consider-
ably. 51
In addition to the fact that preventive commitment is not used much,
conclusions about its effect and effectiveness have been mixed. 52 To be sure,
many studies of preventive commitment in North Carolina have been
optimistic. 153 In their 1987 study, for example, researchers concluded that
"most OPC [preventive outpatient commitment] respondents had no dangerous
behavior during the follow-up period after their OPC orders," that "results
attest to the success of OPC in obtaining compliance with medication and
treatment," and that "[w]hen respondents show up and begin treatment, OPC
works in terms of keeping patients in treatment and on medication, increasing
compliance, permitting residence outside an institution and social interaction
outside the home, and maintaining patients in the community with few
dangerous episodes."'" In their 1990 study, these same researchers concluded
that "close to half of these patients ... never failed to show for their appoint-
ments without giving an acceptable excuse and rescheduling during the three
months of their OPC."'' 55
In another 1990 study, researchers concluded that
[i]f the trend of sharp reductions in admission rates, coupled with less dramatic
decreases in the number of inpatient days, is sustained by further research, one could
then argue that patients clearly experience substantial reduction in admission rates
after involuntary outpatient commitment, even though a few who are admitted after
outpatient commitment remain in the hospital for lengthy periods. Regardless of that
trend, both reductions were statistically significant. Clearly, even under the most
conservative estimates for measuring institutionalization, the impact of involuntary
outpatient commitment on the revolving-door syndrome is strong."
However, in her 1992 review of the empirical studies to date (studies of
outpatient commitment in North Carolina, as well as the District of Columbia,
Nebraska, Tennessee, New Mexico, and Arizona) Kathleen Maloy vigorously
criticized the researchers' methodology and concluded that "these studies
provide almost no valid empirical evidence in support of the effectiveness of
150. Swartz interview, supra note 10.
151. Id.
152. See generally MALOY, supra note 145.
153. Studies of North Carolina's outpatient commitment statutes (before the expansion of the
substantive criteria) were also generally positive. See id. at 6-8. The American Psychiatric Association
has also been optimistic, concluding that outpatient commitment (of any sort) is the best solution for
"those with psychotic illnesses which respond well to antipsychotic medication, but who have a
demonstrated pattern of noncompliance with medication after inpatient discharge," and "those patients
who need externally imposed structure in order to function as outpatients but who are not capable of
requesting the establishment of such structure on their own." APA REPORT, supra note 6, at 16.
154. See Hiday & Scheid-Cook, Critical Appraisal, supra note 11, at 224, 226, 229.
155. Hiday & Scheid-Cook, Compliance, supra note 140, at 87.
156. Fernandez & Nygard, supra note 124, at 1004.
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[involuntary outpatient commitment] laws vis-A-vis treatment compliance,
success in the community for people with severe and persistent mental illness,
or amelioration of the problems associated with 'revolving door' patients. 157
Most of the empirical studies, she concludes, "have serious flaws in their study
design and research methodology."'' 8  Thus, the jury is still out on the
effectiveness of outpatient commitment.
C. Problems
The North Carolina scheme is noteworthy for its expansion of the state's
power over a much broader portion of the population and for its failure to
provide for supervision of mental health professionals. While preventive
commitment orders are not "enforceable" in the sense that they envision
forcible medication, and while they are not enforced by the legally available
method of contempt, they do, practically speaking, place a great deal of
unsupervised power in the hands of community mental health care providers.
In particular, treatment options are left to the clinic by the assigning district
court judge. Thus, noncompliance is usually handled at the clinic level,
informally, and sometimes with threats of inpatient placement that is not
actually an option under the statute, though the patient may not realize this.
So while preventive commitment in North Carolina probably passes muster
under the federal constitution, the question for policymakers and legislators
must be broader than constitutionality.159
Ordinarily, outpatient arrangements provide advantages to both the state
and the families of mental health patients. From the point of view of the
family, outpatient placement provides the advantages of state intervention
(notably treatment and psychological coercion) without the disruption of
hospitalization."6 It also introduces the patient to the experience of living in
the community in a nonpsychotic state 61 (something rarely possible when he
is a revolving door patient). And from the state's point of view, service in a
community mental health clinic is considerably less expensive than inpatient
hospitalization.162 But when the state's role expands with the use of more
157. MALOY, supra note 145, at 1. For example, she argues that the 1987 Hiday and Scheid-Cook
study may not have had reliable controls, and may not have eliminated bias inherent in their process
of selecting groups to study. Id. at 15-16. She writes: "one cannot conclude, as the authors did, that
the results of their study indicate that outpatient commitment 'was successful."' Id. at 16.
158. Id. at 22. For a more recent (but less critical) review of the research to date, see Marvin S.
Swartz et al., New Directions in Research on Involuntary Outpatient Commitment, PSYCHIATRIC
SERVICES (forthcoming 1995).
159. For a well-balanced review of the arguments for and against involuntary outpatient commitment
(not preventive commitment per se), see Mulvey et al., supra note 144, at 571, 579 (acknowledging that
treatment providers need to be monitored and discretion needs to be checked, and that an "absolutist
stance that does not allow for any coercive element connected to the treatment of this group seems to
preserve an ideal at the expense of human suffering").
160. McCafferty & Dooley, supra note 6, at 277-78.
161. Mulvey et al., supra note 144, at 578.
162. Stefan, supra note 5, at 288.
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relaxed commitment criteria, these factors play out differently. To be sure,
there is support for the expanded state role of preventive commitment from
parent and family advocacy groups, as well as mental health patients ("consum-
ers"),' 63 because the state now provides treatment for persons who would
otherwise be a burden at home and not be treated. But when it expands the
number of persons under the umbrella of its civil commitment powers (in one
form or the other), the state may not actually reduce its own expenses.6 The
state runs the risk of increasing the total number of involuntary committees at
the expense, perhaps, of funding for involuntary inpatient facilities or of funding
for voluntary committees. 65 In fact, to the extent that studies suggest
inadequate resources at community mental health clinics and unequal funding
across the state of North Carolina, the state may already face precisely this
problem.
Another danger of this unchecked power is the specter of "social monitor-
ing." One group of researchers, for example, predicted in 1987 that "[i]f
injections can be given and blood drawn, then arguments can be made from a
treatment perspective for reviewing, programming, and monitoring situational
aspects of a patient's life (for example, drinking behavior, peer associations,
family life)." 16 7 This danger inheres, however, in the legislative decision to
defer to the judgment of medical professionals. And to some extent, medical
treatment might be "greatly enhanced when it can be directed broadly at several
spheres of the patient's life, rather than myopically focused on intrapersonal
dynamics or biologic underpinnings."1" It is open to advocacy groups to point
out abuse of this broad ranging power, and open to the legislature to revamp
the statutes. None of the empirical studies suggests yet that such abuse is taking
place.
V
CONCLUSION
While North Carolina's present preventive commitment scheme probably
satisfies substantive due process, noncompliance problems have aroused the
interest of reformers. One suggested reform has been a statutory option for
163. Id.; McCafferty & Dooley, supra note 6, at 277.
164. Indeed, a recent study concluded that a major factor contributing to compliance problems in
North Carolina was a shortage of funding for Community Mental Health Clinics. Hiday & Scheid-
Cook, Compliance, supra note 140, at 88.
165. See, e.g., Durham & LaFond, supra note 11, at 444 (noting that in Washington outpatient
commitment increased the number of involuntary committees at the expense of voluntary committees);
see also Hiday & Scheid-Cook, Critical Appraisal, supra note 11, at 230 (describing the tremendous
variation in community mental health clinic knowledge, dedication, commitment, and resources);
Seicshnaydre, supra note 12, at 1974-75 (noting concern that funding shortages lead to a "nonsystem"
of community treatment, acknowledging the unmet treatment needs of mentally ill homeless).
166. Mulvey et al., supra note 144, at 575.
167. Id. at 576.
168. Id. at 578.
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forcible medication of outpatients. 69 Without a doubt, such a provision would
raise serious substantive due process concerns. Moreover, this suggestion, and
the larger controversy over noncompliance, highlights the fundamental problem
with the present scheme: While constitutional, it is unnecessarily and
inappropriately coercive.
A. Forcible Medication and Substantive Due Process
The two most recent U.S. Supreme Court opinions on forcible medication,
while not endorsing strict scrutiny of such provisions, suggest that a statutory
option to medicate noncompliant outpatients forcibly would not satisfy due
process. First, in Washington v. Harper,170 despite noting that "forcible
injection of medication into a nonconsenting person's body represents a
substantial interference with that person's liberty,' 171 the Court held that states
may forcibly medicate a mentally ill inmate if the state establishes first that the
inmate poses a danger to himself or to others and then that forcible medication
is in his medical interests. 72 The Court later recharacterized the Harper
prongs as, first, an overriding justification, and, second, medical appropriate-
ness. 73 Subsequently, in Riggins v. Nevada,174 the Court held that forcible
medication in the trial setting would require "at least" as much justification as
it had in the setting of a prison inmate. 175 The language in Riggins could be
construed as an endorsement of rigorous review; indeed, the dissent believed the
Court had applied strict scrutiny.'76 However, it had not. While it wrote of
"overriding justifications" and "less restrictive alternatives," the Court was not
establishing a constitutional floor. Justice O'Connor, writing for the Court, was
quite clear on this point. By writing that "Nevada certainly would have satisfied
due process" if it had found forcible medication medically appropriate and if,
after considering less intrusive alternatives, it had found the procedure essential
for the safety of the defendant (or of others), the Court declared what would
be sufficient to satisfy due process not what would be necessary. 77  Thus,
wrote the Court, "we have no occasion to finally prescribe such substantive
standards as mentioned above.' ' 78
Critically, forcible medication of outpatients is as intrusive as forcible
medication of inmates or inpatients; "forcible injection of medication into a
nonconsenting person's body"'179 is not less intrusive simply because the state's
169. Swartz interview, supra note 10.
170. 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
171. Id. at 229.
172. Id. at 227.
173. Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 135 (1992).
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 156 ("The Court today, for instance, appears to adopt a standard of strict scrutiny.").
177. Id. at 135-36.
178. Id. at 136.
179. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 229 (1990).
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control of the person otherwise is less sweeping. Under Harper and Riggins, the
state must articulate concerns about an imminent threat to the safety of the
patient or of others, and it cannot do that when it is administering preventive
medicine.
B. Implications of the Noncompliance Controversy
The empirical work on North Carolina's preventive commitment scheme'l °
suggests that a forcible medication provision might not be the wisest approach
and that the present scheme might be unnecesssarily coercive.
Several factors suggest that forcible medication is exactly the wrong solution.
First, noncompliance problems may only seem significant; quite possibly,
noncompliance with outpatient orders is no more common than noncompliance
with other treatment regimes.' 81 Second, coercive solutions may be inappro-
priate to the extent that a tendency to noncompliance is part of the disease
itsef.1 2 Third, experience has shown that noncoercive measures are quite
effective in obtaining compliance. Clinicians are often successful when they use
informal means, such as phone calls and letters, to induce compliance.'
Finally, concerns about the detrimental effect of introducing adversarial
processes and coercion into the therapeutic relationship suggest that a
cooperative solution, such as community-based individualized case management,
might be the better, and more humane, option.
While the practice and definition of "case management" vary nationwide, it
offers the beneficial aspects of outpatient commitment (treatment in the
community, in particular) without the introduction of a judicial hearing and
court order. Roughly speaking, case management involves the following:
detailed attention to the individual client; provision of services where the client
is located (rather than in a clinic); a low staff-to-client ratio; frequency of
services (even once a day); basic functions such as client outreach, service
planning, and client advocacy; and more extended services viewed in the
broader context of community resources, such as local libraries, friends, or the
YMCA. Case management is also envisioned as an indefinite arrangement.'
84
A five-year study presently underway in North Carolina may well prove that
case management could adequately replace the present scheme. The Duke
Mental Health Study, which will conclude in 1998, covers nine counties in the
central part of the state (Chatham, Durham, Franklin, Granville, Guilford,
Orange, Person, Vance, and Warren). Reseachers are studying the relationship
between the existence of a court order and compliance, and the effectiveness of
180. See supra text accompanying notes 146-58.
181. See supra text accompanying notes 128-29.
182. See supra text accompanying note 127.
183. See supra text accompanying notes 141-42.
184. Gail K. Robinson & Gail Toff-Bergman, Choices in Case Management: Current Knowledge &
Practice for Mental Health Programs 5 (Mental Health Policy Resource Center 1990). For a thorough
overview of case management practices, see generally id.
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active case management at local community mental health centers as an
alternative to court order. Specifically, they offered active case management to
persons ordered to receive outpatient commitment. Fifty percent of the
randomly selected participants were released from court order. The primary
goal of the study is to examine whether court-ordered treatment has an effect
over and above case management and optimal community treatment."
The Duke Mental Health Study should answer whether coercion is necessary
in the care of revolving door patients. If, as the empirical evidence to date
suggests will be the case, active case management adequately ensures
compliance, then it may well be the remedy for problems inherent in requiring
active compliance with a court order from a subset of the population inherently
prone to passivity. In the meantime, reforms to strengthen the coercive nature
of the present scheme are unwarranted. Any reforms pending the outcome of
the Duke Mental Health Study should decrease coercion and emphasize
cooperation. To the extent that the present scheme is already unnecessarily and
inappropriately coercive, it may be constitutional, but from a public policy
standpoint, it is a "bad idea."
185. See DUKE MENTAL HEALTH STUDY 13 (unpublished bound booklet available from the Duke
University Medical Center Department of Psychiatry), which presents the issue as:
In a number of studies in N.C., OPC has been shown to be effective in reducing rates of
rehospitalization and lengths of stay. However, by and large, those counties which use OPC
tend to provide more aggressive treatment in general, and those counties which use little OPC
generally provide less aggressive treatment. This raises an important question about the
effectiveness of OPC over and above the effectiveness of community treatment. Does coerced
outpatient treatment add anything once community-based treatment has been optimized?

